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Abstract
We study the revenue maximization problem with an imprecisely estimated distribution of a
single buyer or several independent and identically distributed buyers given that this estimation
is not far away from the true distribution. We use the earth mover’s distance to capture the
estimation error between those two distributions in terms of both values and their probabilities,
i.e., the error in value space given a quantile, and the error in quantile space given a value.
We give explicit characterization of the optimal mechanisms for the single buyer setting. For
the multi-buyer case, we provide an algorithm that finds an approximately optimal mechanism
(FPTAS) among the family of second price mechanisms with a fixed reserve.
1 Introduction
One of the most important topics in mechanism design is the revenue maximization problem.
Optimal mechanisms have been well studied in both single-item setting, following the seminar work
of Myerson (1981), and multi-item setting, see Cai et al. (2012a,b). There is also a huge literature
on approximately optimal simple mechanisms, see Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen (2018) for a
detailed discussion. All those papers assume that the seller knows the exact distribution of the
buyers. However, according to Harsanyi (1967), this assumption is hard to realize in practice.
To overcome this problem, lots of studies have focused on revenue maximization with weaker
assumptions. In Cole and Roughgarden (2014), they assume that the seller only has access to the
samples of the buyers’ distributions, and the goal is to maximize the revenue using the distribution
reconstructed from the samples. The model in Chen et al. (2018) assumes that the seller has
oracle access to the value and quantile information about the true distribution. Similar to the goal
of sample complexity, the goal here is to reconstruct the distribution with limited queries. The
prior-independent mechanism design model considered in Devanur et al. (2011) adopts an extreme
assumption that the seller has no information about the distribution. They assume that the buyers’
valuations are independent and identically distributed. All those papers focus on the nature of the
imprecision on the prior distribution, which will also be the main focus of our paper.
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1.1 Our Problem and Results
The seller is given an imprecisely estimated distribution of a single buyer or several i.i.d buyers,
and the assumption is that it is within ǫ earth mover’s distance to the true distribution. The seller
designs a mechanism based on the estimated distribution, while its performance is evaluated with
respect to the worst case distribution within ǫ earth mover’s distance to the estimated distribution.
We want to design the optimal mechanism in this worst case performance metric. This will give a
lower bound for any true distribution in that range and we call such mechanism the most robust
mechanism.
In section 3, we solve the max-min problem when there is a single buyer. The idea is to write this
problem using a linear program, and transform it into its dual form. By analyzing the properties
of the dual, we can successfully characterize the optimal robust mechanism. Here, we state the
results for continuous distributions informally.
Informal Theorem 1. When there is a single buyer, the allocation x for the optimal mechanism
satisfies that ∃a, b:
x(v) =


0 ∀v < a;
(ln v
a
)/(ln b
a
) ∀a ≤ v ≤ b;
1 ∀b < v.
The formal result are stated in Theorem 1 for discrete distributions. For continuous distribution,
we can discretize the support and come up with such mechanism that is arbitrarily close to the
optimal. As we show in the above theorem, the optimal mechanism is a randomized mechanism.
Moreover, using this characterization, we can bound the gap between the optimal randomized
mechanism and the optimal deterministic mechanism for the max-min goal, which is shown in
Theorem 3 and 4. In section 4, we first characterize the worst case distribution for the second price
mechanism.
Informal Theorem 2. When there are multiple buyers, the worst case distribution for the second
price mechanism satisfies that, there exists k, l such that k < l, the density between value k and l is
0, and the distribution outside [k, l] remains the same comparing to the distribution known by the
seller.
This result is formally stated in Theorem 5. Using this characterization as a bridge, we are
able to further characterize the distribution with minimum revenue for second price mechanism
with a fixed reserve. Moreover, in Theorem 6, for Lipschitz continuous distributions with bounded
support, we design a FPTAS algorithm for finding the optimal robust reserve for the second price
auction when there are multiple buyers. Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2011) show that by decreasing
the theoretical optimal reserve price by a constant factor, the revenue increases in practice. They
do not provide theoretical intuition for their result. Our result indicates that one possible reason
is that the underlying true distribution is not identical to the distribution known by the seller, and
the original theoretical optimal reserve price is not robust with respect to the imprecision of the
distribution.
1.2 Previous Work on Robust Mechanism Design
There are a number of works studying the robustness of mechanisms at different levels of prior
imprecision in both econ literature, e.g., Bergemann and Schlag (2008); Carroll and Segal (2016);
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Carroll (2017), and computer science literature, e.g., Cai and Daskalakis (2017); Gravin and Lu
(2018). To quantify the imprecision, some may define a distance metric for distributions, and then
an imprecise distribution can be characterized as any distribution within a distance of ǫ from the
true one. With those imprecise distributions, we can design a max-min game between the seller
and the adversarial nature: the seller proposes a mechanism, and then the adversary chooses a
distribution with minimum expected revenue generated by that mechanism. The performance of
the optimal mechanism is studied under such circumstance. For one dimensional density functions
f, f ′ and their corresponding cumulative distributions F,F ′, we present the informal definition of
some metrics used in previous works:
• Total Variation distance (TV distance): supS⊂[0,+∞) |f(S)− f ′(S)|
• Kolmogorov distance: supx≥0 |F (x)− F ′(x)|
• Prokhorov distance: inf{ǫ|∀S ⊂ [0,∞), f(S) ≤ f ′(Sǫ)+ǫ}, where Sǫ = {x ∈ [0,+∞)|miny∈S |x−
y| ≤ ǫ}.
• Earth Mover’s distance (First order Wasserstein distance): infπ(x,y)∈Π
∫ +∞
0
∫ +∞
0 π(x, y)|x −
y|dxdy where Π is the set of all the two dimensional distribution whose marginals are respec-
tively f and f ′.
With these distance metrics, some researches have been conducted on robust mechanisms design.
Cai and Daskalakis (2017) studies the revenue guarantee of simple and robust mechanism in multi-
item, multi-buyer settings. By sampling from the distribution O(
log( 1
δ
)
ǫ2
) times, they are able to learn
the marginal distribution for each item that is within ǫ TV-distance, with probability at least 1−δ.
In such setting, they also study the upper bound of approximation ratio for simple mechanisms, such
as rationed sequential posted price mechanisms or anonymous sequential posted price mechanisms
with entry fees. The work of Bergemann and Schlag (2008) focuses on the Prokhorov distance.
When there is a single buyer, a single item and a potential ǫ Prokhorov distance between the true
prior and the known distribution, the paper examines the properties and the equilibrium of the
maxmin game via an implicit function, and they characterize the seller’s optimal mechanism as
posting a deterministic price.
Most of the distance metrics are chosen for the convenience of computation, while disadvantages
of such choices do exist.
• Sensitivity to Distribution: Some distance measures only focus on the errors in probability
space, not the errors in value space. For instance, consider two distributions which are 1 and
1− ǫ respectively with probability 1, where ǫ > 0 is a small constant. Those two distributions
should be considered to be close to each other, with a small error in value space. However,
the TV distance and Kolmogorov distance between these two distributions both achieve their
maximum 1, indicating that a tiny deviation of distributions can bring about a giant variation
distances.
• Sensitivity to Structure: Some previous results for certain metrics benefit from the prop-
erty that there is a distribution which is statistically dominated by all the distributions within
certain distance. For Prokhorov distance and Kolmogorov distance, such distributions is to
move the the probability of measure ǫ from the highest value to the lowest. For single item
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settings, the max-min mechanism becomes the optimal mechanism on the dominated distri-
bution due to revenue monotonicity. This property does not hold in general, such as the
robustness for the earth mover’s distance, and hence their results cannot be generalized for
more general settings.
Therefore, proper distance measures should take the errors in value space into consideration, i.e.
either there is a small error in estimating the value or the probability of a large error in estimating
the value is small. This property is well characterized by the earth mover’s distance. Moreover,
there does not exist a single distribution that is stochastically dominated by all other distributions
within ǫ earth mover’s distance to the known distribution. Thus, we cannot exploit the revenue
monotonicity of the single item auction. As a result, our mechanism is much more complex than
the previous results, in the sense that our mechanism is randomized.
2 Preliminaries
In this paper, we consider the problem that the seller tries to sell a single indivisible item to the
buyers whose values are independently and identically distributed. Let M = {1, . . . ,m} denote
the set of buyers. For the sake of simplicity, we start with discrete distributions, and we will show
how to generalize our results to continuous distributions. For any buyer j ∈M , his value vj takes
from a discrete value set V = {v0, . . . , vn}, where v0 < v1 < · · · < vn. We assume that the seller
knows the set V and a discrete distribution f = (fi)i∈{0,...,n}, where fi is the probability of value
vi. When we consider the continuous distribution, we will use the notation and let f(v) denote the
probability density at value v. We denote F as the corresponding cumulative probability function.
Note that this is not the true underlying distribution for the buyers.
We assume that the error of the distribution is small. We characterize this error using earth
mover’s distance. To change from f to f ′, we need to move a possibility measure at least
∣∣∣∑j<i(fj−
f ′j)
∣∣∣ from vi to vi−1 or from vi−1 to vi. Therefore, the earth mover’s distance between discrete
distributions f and f ′ is equivalently defined as
EMD(f, f ′) =
∑
i∈[n]
(vi − vi−1)
∣∣∣∑
j<i
(fj − f ′j)
∣∣∣ (1)
We assume that the true distribution for the buyers is within ǫ earth mover’s distance of the known
distribution f . That is, the seller knows f and knows that the true distribution f ′ ∈ EMD(f, ǫ),
where
EMD(f, ǫ) = {f ′|EMD(f, f ′) ≤ ǫ} (2)
Since both probability density function f and cumulative probability function F uniquely decides
a distribution, we also use notations EMD(F,F ′), EMD(F, ǫ) for the same meaning.
In this paper, we use M = (x, p) to denote a mechanism, where x = (xji )i∈{0,...,n},j∈M is the
allocation rule and p = (pji )i∈{0,...,n},j∈M is the payment rule. Here x
j
i is the probability that buyer
j gets the item when he bids vi, and p
j
i is the price that buyer j pays when he bids vi. When
there is only one buyer, we will omit the superscription for the allocation and the price without
ambiguity.
The goal of the seller is to find a individual rational (IR) incentive compatible (IC) mechanism
M to maximize the minimum revenue among all those possible distributions. That is, denoting
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Rev(M, f) as the revenue of a IR-IC mechanism M with buyer distribution f , and denoting M as
the set of mechanisms we consider for the setting, the goal of the seller is to find a mechanism M∗
such that
M∗ = arg max
M∈M
min
f ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)
Rev(M, f ′) (3)
In the rest of this paper, we will show how to achieve this goal when there is only one buyer
and the mechanism set M is the set of all IR-IC mechanisms, or when there are multiple buyers
and the mechanism set M is the set of second price mechanisms with fixed reserves. Moreover, for
the single buyer case, we start with the assumption that the distribution f known by the seller is
regular, i.e. the virtual value φi = vi− 1−Fifi is non-decreasing Myerson (1981). Note that this does
not imply that the true distribution is regular. In fact, this assumption can be removed and we
formally discuss it in section 3.1.
3 Single Buyer Case
When there is a single buyer, the form of the mechanism is simply posting a (randomized) menu to
the buyer, and let the buyer choose his favorite entry. In this case, we prove that the mechanism
satisfying the max-min goal has a very simple form. Formally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. When there is a single buyer and M is the set of all IR-IC mechanisms, for any
discrete distribution f with support {v0, v1, . . . , vn}, there exists a polynomial time algorithm that
finds mechanism M∗ = argmaxM∈Mminf ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)Rev(M, f ′). Moreover, mechanism M∗ =
(x, p) takes one of the following forms.
1. For any i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, xi = 1, pi = v0.
2. There exist 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ n such that λ = 1/(∑bj=a vj−vj−1vj ), and
xi =


0 0 ≤ i < a∑i
j=a
λ(vj−vj−1)
vj
a ≤ i ≤ b
1 b < i ≤ n.
In order to solve problem (3), first we transform the problem into a simpler form. According to
Devanur et al. (2016), the revenue of the seller is monotone with respect to statistical dominance.
Therefore, we only need to consider the distribution where the probability mass is moved from a
high value to low value. Let the probability transferred from value vi to vi−1 be ti. Then the new
distribution f ′ satisfies that f ′i = fi + ti+1 − ti and the earth mover distance between f and f ′ can
be written as
EMD(f, f ′) =
n∑
i=1
ti(vi − vi−1).
Let the allocation and payment rule of a mechanismM be (x, p). We can write (3) as the following
explicit mathematical programming:
max
x,p
min
t
n∑
i=0
pifi −
n∑
i=1
ti(pi − pi−1) (4)
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vixi − pi ≥ vixj − pj, ∀0 ≤ i, j ≤ n
vixi − pi ≥ 0, ∀0 ≤ i ≤ n
pi ≥ 0, 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1, ∀0 ≤ i ≤ n
ti + fi−1 ≥ ti−1, ∀2 ≤ i ≤ n
ti ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n
fn ≥ tn,
n∑
i=1
ti(vi − vi−1) ≤ ǫ.
Fix a feasible pair of variables x, p and focus on the minimization part of the optimization prob-
lem (4). Since the term
∑n
i=1 pifi is a constant with respect to t, the minimization problem can be
written equivalently into the following form.
min
t
−
n∑
i=1
ti(pi − pi−1) (5)
ti+1 + fi ≥ ti, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
ti ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n
fn ≥ tn,
n∑
i=1
ti(vi − vi−1) ≤ ǫ.
We can write its dual form as follows:
max
β,λ
−λǫ−
n∑
i=1
βifi (6)
βi − βi−1 + λ(vi − vi−1) ≥ pi − pi−1, ∀2 ≤ i ≤ n
β1 + λ(vi − vi−1) ≥ p1 − p0,
λ ≥ 0, βi ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n
We define z = {zi}i∈{0,...,n} such that z0 = p0 and zi = pi − βi,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n. Also, we say a vector v
dominates u if and only if for any i, vi ≥ ui. According to Myerson’s lemma, in a DSIC mechanism,
the allocation is non-decreasing. We denote P as the set of all possible payment rules of the IR-IC
mechanisms, and we denote Z as the set of all possible z’s that are dominated by some p ∈ P .
Obviously, P ⊂ Z for every vector dominates itself. By strong duality, the optimal of the primal
and the dual are equal. Hence, by substituting the primal problem (5) with the dual problem (6),
we can rewrite the original optimization problem (4) equivalently as follows.
max
λ,z(λ,β,p)
n∑
i=1
zifi − λǫ (7)
zi − zi−1 ≤ λ(vi − vi−1), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n
z ∈ Z, λ ≥ 0.
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To solve problem (7), we are going to reduce it into another problem:
max
λ,z
n∑
i=1
zifi − λǫ (8)
zi − zi−1 ≤ λ(vi − vi−1), ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n
z ∈ P, λ ≥ 0.
Intuitively, the solution to (8) is the payment rule of an IR-IC mechanism of which expected
revenue minus λǫ achieves the maximum and adjacent payments are bounded by a multiple of λ.
To show that the the solutions to problem (7) and (8) are the same, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 1. If (λ, z) is the solution of the optimization problem (7), z ∈ P .
In order to prove the above lemma, we make the following observations.
Property 1. If (λ, z) is the solution to the optimization problem (7), z is non-decreasing.
Proof. Suppose (λ∗, z) optimizes problem (7) and there exist i such that zi > zi+1. By constraint
of problem (7), there exists p′ ∈ P and p′ dominate z. We construct another vector z∗ such that
z∗j = zj ,∀j 6= i+ 1, and z∗i+1 = zi. Since p′ is non-decreasing, z∗i+1 = z∗i = zi ≤ p′i ≤ p′i+1 and ∀j 6=
i+ 1, z∗j = zj ≤ p′j. Hence p′ dominates z∗ as well. Moreover,
z∗i+1 − z∗i = 0 < λ∗(vi+1 − vi),
z∗i+2 − z∗i+1 = zi+2 − zi < zi+2 − zi+1 ≤ λ∗(vi+2 − vi+1),
z∗j+1 − z∗j = zj+1 − zj ≤ λ∗(vj+1 − vj),∀j /∈ {i, i+ 1}.
Thus, (λ∗, z∗) satisfies all the constraints and z∗ · f > z · f . Hence we get the contradiction and z
is non-decreasing.
Property 2. Let z be a non-decreasing sequence. If there exists p ∈ P such that p dominates z,
we have z ∈ P .
Proof. For a non-decreasing sequence z, denoting x as the allocation for the payment p that dom-
inates z, we prove z ∈ P by finding a feasible allocation x′ for z. For any allocation and payment
pair (x, p), it is truthful if and only if
pi − pj
vi
≤ xi − xj ≤ pi − pj
vj
,∀i > j. (9)
We set x′0 = x0. For any i ∈ [n], we set
x′i = x
′
i−1 +
zi − zi−1
vi
.
It is easy to check that x′ is monotone and it satisfies the truthful condition in inequality 9. We
only need to check that xn ≤ 1 and it is individual rational. First, we observe
x′n = x
′
0 +
∑
1≤i≤n
zi − zi−1
vi
≤ x0 +
∑
1≤i≤n
pi − pi−1
vi
≤ xn ≤ 1.
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The first inequality holds because p dominates z, and the maximum is achieved only when zi = pi
for any i ≥ 1. By construction that x′0 = x0 and z0 = p0, x′0v0 − z0 ≥ 0. Using induction, for any
i ∈ [n], we have
x′ivi − zi = (x′i−1 +
zi − zi−1
vi
)vi − zi
= x′i−1vi − zi−1
≥ x′i−1vi−1 − zi−1.
Thus the allocation x′ and payment z satisfies individual rationality, and z ∈ P .
Combining Property 1 and 2, Lemma 1 holds. Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. By Lemma 1, the solution (λ∗, z∗) to problem (8) is the solution to problem
(7). Now, we can view z∗ as the payment rule of a mechanism and let p∗i = z
∗
i , β
∗
i = 0,∀1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Thus, if a mechanism has the same payment rule as z∗, it is an optimal mechanism to problem (7).
So all we have to do now is find a mechanism that optimizes problem (8), which is the solution to
problem (7) as well.
Let z ∈ P and y be the corresponding allocation rule such that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, yi − yi−1 =
zi−zi−1
vi
, and y0 =
z0
v0
. By Myerson’s Lemma for discrete distributions, we have
n∑
i=1
zifi − λǫ =
n∑
i=1
yiφifi − λǫ. (10)
Let k be the index that φk ≥ 0 and ∀i < k, φi < 0. Fixing yk and λ, by the constraint of
problem (8), we have yj − yj−1 = zj−zj−1vj ≤
λ(vj−vj−1)
vj
. Therefore, for any i > k, yi ≤ min{yk +∑i
j=k+1
λ(vj−vj−1)
vj
, 1}. In order to maximize the objective, all the above inequalities should be
equalities. Similarly, for any i < k, yi ≥ max{yk −
∑k
j=i+1
λ(vj−vj−1)
vj
, 0}, and the equalities should
hold to maximize the objective. When λ = 0, we can easily get that for any 0 ≤ i ≤ n, yi = yk,
which is optimized at yk = 1. This characterization is equivalent to the case 1 in Theorem 1.
When λ > 0, there exist 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ n, such that
yi =


0 0 ≤ i < a
yk −
∑k
j=i+1
λ(vj−vj−1)
vj
a ≤ i < k
yk +
∑i
j=k+1
λ(vj−vj−1)
vj
k ≤ i ≤ b
1 b < i ≤ n
Fixing a and b, the allocation y can be uniquely determined by the value ya. Substituting
equation 10 and the characterization of variable y back into problem (8), we can get the following
optimization problem with ya as a variable.
max
λ,ya
yafaφa +
b∑
i=a+1
(ya +
i∑
j=a+1
λ(vj − vj−1)
vj
)fiφi +
n∑
i=b+1
fiφi − λǫ (11)
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ya +
b∑
j=a+1
λ(vj − vj−1)
vj
≤ 1,
ya +
b+1∑
j=a+1
λ(vj − vj−1)
vj
≥ 1, if b < n
ya ≤ λ(va − va−1)
va
, if a > 0
ya ≥ 0, λ > 0.
Since the objective and constraints are linear in λ and ya, the optimum is reached at the
boundary of the domain. Moreover, when λ > 0, for the boundary case, ya = 0 or ya =
λ(va−va−1)
va
.
In both cases, we can get that there exist 0 ≤ a′ ≤ b′ ≤ n such that λ = 1/(∑b′i=a′ vi−vi−1vi ), and the
allocation y takes the following form. The payment z can be computed accordingly.
yi =


0 0 ≤ i < a′∑j
i=a′
λ(vj−vj−1)
vj
a′ ≤ i ≤ b′
1 b′ < i ≤ n.
zi =


0 0 ≤ i < a′
λ(vi − va′) a′ ≤ i ≤ b′
λ(vb′ − va′) b′ < i ≤ n.
This characterization is equivalent to the case 2 in Theorem 1. By brute force searching all possible
pair of a, b and select the one with highest expected revenue, we find the desired mechanism that
maximizes the objective value of problem (7) and (8). Therefore, we have for any 0 ≤ i ≤ n,
xi = yi, pi = zi and the mechanism that optimizes problem (7) is also an optimal solution for
problem (3). Thus finishes the proof of Theorem 1.
3.1 Irregular Distribution
In this section, we show the result for the single buyer case even when the prior distribution known
by the seller is irregular. First we state the theorem.
Theorem 2. When there is a single buyer and M is the set of all IR-IC mechanisms, for any con-
tinuous distribution f , mechanism M∗ = argmaxM∈Mminf ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)Rev(M, f ′) with allocation
and payment (x, p) takes the following form: there exist s ≥ 1 and a set {(a1, b1), . . . , (as, bs)} such
that λ = 1/(
∑s
i=1 ln
bi
ai
), and
x(v) =


0 0 ≤ v < a1
λ(
∑i−1
j=1 ln
bj
aj
+ ln v
ai
) ai ≤ v ≤ bi,∀1 ≤ i ≤ s
λ
∑i
j=1 ln
bj
aj
bi < v < ai+1,∀1 ≤ i ≤ s− 1
1 bs < v,
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Note that given the allocation rule, the payment can be computed using Myerson’s payment
identity Myerson (1981). Here, instead of proving that Theorem 2 is correct using duality, we
present another intuitive idea to show the correctness of the theorem. This idea will help us have
a further understanding of the result. First, we plot the revenue curve of the known distribution,
where the x-axis is the quantile of the distribution, i.e., the probability that is larger than or equal
to a certain value.
✲
✻
γ
R(q)
F
G
qs q
′
s q1 q
′
10 1 q
Figure 1: The revenue curve of the known distribution F and the distribution G with minimum
revenue.
From the graph, we can easily verify that for any constant ǫ, there exists a unique γ that inter-
sects the distribution at quantiles in set Q = {(q1, q′1), . . . , (qs, q′s)}, and the resulting distribution G
satisfies that EMD(G,F ) = ǫ. Letting {(a1, b1), . . . , (as, bs)} be the value that corresponds to the
set Q under distribution F , according to the characterization of the single item optimal Bayesian
mechanism Myerson (1981); Hartline and Karlin (2007), the mechanism M∗ designed in Theorem
2 is optimal for distribution G. Moreover, according to the payment rule defined in Theorem 2,
the distribution with minimum revenue is exactly distribution G. Therefore, considering any other
mechanism M′, we have
min
f ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)
Rev(M′, f ′) ≤ Rev(M′, G) ≤ Rev(M∗, G)
= min
f ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)
Rev(M∗, f ′),
and Theorem 2 holds.
3.2 Deterministic Mechanism
In real world, the complex randomized algorithm may not be applicable. Instead, people will try to
approximate the optimal with simple deterministic mechanisms. When the distribution is known
and there is a single item, the deterministic mechanism is indeed optimal. Here in this section,
we will show that when the known distribution is within ǫ earth mover’s distance of the true
distribution, the deterministic mechanism is still a good approximation to the optimal randomized
mechanism with respect to the max-min objective. Formally, we have the following theorem. Note
that in this section, we do not require the distribution known by the seller is regular.
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Theorem 3. When there is a single buyer and M is the set of all IR-IC mechanisms, for any
distribution f , let
R = max
M∈M
min
f ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)
Rev(M, f ′)
For any constant ǫ ≤ R, there exists a deterministic mechanism M such that
min
f ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)
Rev(M, f ′) ≥ R− 2
√
ǫR+ ǫ.
Proof. It is obvious that R ≤ OPT (f), where OPT (f) is the optimal revenue of f . So we only
need to prove that
min
f ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)
Rev(M, f ′) ≥ OPT (f)− 2
√
ǫ · OPT (f) + ǫ.
Note that for distribution f , there exists a simple deterministic mechanism that achieve optimal
revenue. Assume that this mechanism posts price a and sells the item when the buyer’s value is
larger than or equal to a. We assume the item is sold with probability b. Clearly, ab = OPT (f).
Suppose we have a new mechanism that posts price x ≤ a− ǫ
b
. Note that since x ≥ 0, ǫ ≤ ab. Next
we bound the probability Prv∼f ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)(v ≥ x). Note that the probability of v ≥ x is at least
the probability of v ≥ a in distribution f minus the probability that can be moved from above a
to below x. Hence, we have
Pr
v∼f ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)
(v ≥ x) ≥ Pr
v∼f
(v ≥ a)− ǫ
a− x = b−
ǫ
a− x.
Therefore,
min
f ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)
Rev(M, f ′) ≥ x(b− ǫ
a− x).
By optimizing x and set it as a−√aǫ
b
, we have
min
f ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)
Rev(M, f ′) ≥ ab− 2
√
abǫ+ ǫ
= OPT (f)− 2
√
ǫ · OPT (f) + ǫ.
Thus finishes the proof of Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. When there is a single buyer and M is the set of all IR-IC mechanisms, for any
constant ǫ ≤ R, there exists a distribution f such that for any deterministic mechanism M, letting
R = maxM∈Mminf ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)Rev(M, f ′),
min
f ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)
Rev(M, f ′) ≤ R− 1
2
√
ǫR.
Proof. Consider the equal revenue distribution on support [1, h]. Applying the result in Theorem
1, we can calculate R ≈ 1 − ǫlnh . When we set h → ∞, we know that the maximin revenue
approaches 1.
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Now we consider the deterministic mechanism which posts price x ≤ h. We divide the analysis
into 2 cases: x < 1 and x ≥ 1. When x ≥ 1, suppose b is the value such that exactly the probability
between x and b is moved to below x. Then, we have
∫ b
x
(
1
v
− 1
b
)dv = ǫ
−1 + x
b
+ ln
b
x
= ǫ.
When ǫ is small, the revenue of posting price x is x
b
≤ 1
1+
√
ǫ+ ǫ
2
≤ 1−
√
ǫ
2 .
When x < 1, also let b be the value such that exactly the probability between x and b is moved
to below x. Then, we have
∫ b
1
(
1
v
− 1
b
)dv + (1− 1
b
)(1− x) = ǫ
ln b+
x
b
− x = ǫ.
When ǫ is small, we have x ≈ b− ǫb
b−1 , and the revenue of posting price x is
x
b
≈ 1− ǫ
b−1 , which is in-
creasing with respect to b. However, the maximum value of b is reached when x approaches 1. There-
fore, the maximum revenue is achieved in case 1 when x ≥ 1, and minf ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)Rev(M, f ′) ≤
1 −
√
ǫ
2 . The exact form of the inequality in the statement of Theorem 4 can be similarly derived
by setting the known distribution f as the equal revenue distribution on [R,∞).
4 Multiple Buyer Case
In this section, we consider the problem where the seller tries to sell a single item to m i.i.d. buyers.
Note that for the multi-buyer case, the max-min problem is not convex. Therefore, we cannot apply
the duality approach as in the single buyer case to have a characterization for the distribution with
minimum revenue. In this section, we will focus on a special class of mechanisms, second price
mechanism with reserves, and as we will show later, the characterization for this set of mechanisms
is not trivial. Moreover, in the single item environment, when the distributions are i.i.d. and
regular, the second price mechanism with a fixed reserve is optimal for revenue maximization.
Therefore, it is nature to conjecture that this simple mechanism still has approximately optimal
performance in our robust setting. We leave the characterization of the approximation ratio of the
second price mechanism with fixed reserve as an open problem. In this section, we will show how to
efficiently compute the optimal robust reserve price for the second price auction. In our following
analysis, we assume that the known distribution f is a Lipschitz continuous distribution. Note that
for any distribution f ′ ∈ EMD(f, ǫ), f ′ may not be Lipschitz continuous.
4.1 Second Price Mechanism
Before stating our computational result, we start with the characterization of the distribution
within ǫ earth-mover’s distance that generates the minimum revenue for the second price auction
M. This characterization will help us understand the minimization part of our max-min problem
for the multi-buyer case, which eventually will help us design the algorithms for finding the optimal
reserve in the robust setting.
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In second price auction, the expected revenue is the expected value of the second highest buyer.
Intuitively, the distribution that generates minimum revenue is the one that differs from the known
distribution only in the quantile corresponding to the second highest buyer. We formalize this idea
and prove it in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5. Let M be the second price mechanism, let g , argminf ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)Rev(M, f ′) denote
the distribution with minimum revenue for mechanismM, and let G be its corresponding cumulative
distribution. Let k be the smallest number such that m−2
m−1 ≤ G(k), we have
1. EMD(G,F ) = ǫ.
2. There exists l ≥ k such that G(v) = G(k) for any k ≤ v ≤ l, and G(v) = F (v) for any v > l.
3. For any v < k,G(v) = F (v).
Proof. First note that if EMD(G,F ) < ǫ, by simply moving some probability from higher value
to lower value, by revenue monotonicity, the expected revenue will decrease. Therefore, we have
EMD(G,F ) = ǫ.
Note that the probability that the second price is larger than a value v is 1 minus the probability
that all value is below value v and the probability that only one value is above value v. That is,
Pr(second price > v) = 1− F ′m(v)−m · F ′m−1(v) · (1− F ′(v))
= 1 + (m− 1)F ′m(v)−m · F ′m−1(v).
Therefore, the expected revenue of running second price mechanism M with distribution f ′ is
Rev(M, f ′) =
∫ ∞
0
Pr(second price > v)dv
=
∫ ∞
0
(1 + (m− 1)F ′m(v)−m · F ′m−1(v))dv. (12)
Since we require that distribution f ′ ∈ EMD(f, ǫ), we know that distribution f ′ satisfies the
constraints that
F ′(∞) = 1,
∫ ∞
v=0
|F ′(v)− F (v)|dv ≤ ǫ, and F ′(v′) ≤ F ′(v),∀v′ ≤ v. (13)
Moreover, since moving the distribution from a lower value to a higher value will not reduce the
revenue. In order to find the distribution that generates minimum revenue, we can assume without
loss of generality that F (v) ≤ F ′(v),∀v. Next we show that with this assumption, minimizing
equation 12 subject to constraint 13 is equivalent to minimizing equation 12 subject to the following
constraint, with a changing of variable F ∗.
F ∗(∞) = 1,
∫ ∞
v=0
|F ∗(v)− F (v)|dv ≤ ǫ, and F (v) ≤ F ∗(v),∀v.
Let J∗(y) be the measure of the set {v|v > 0 and F ∗(v) ≤ y} and let F ′(v) = inf{y|J∗(y) ≥ v}.
Note that in constraint 13, F ′(∞) = 1, F ′(v) is monotone non-decreasing and the measure of the
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set {v|v ≥ 0 and F ′(v) ≤ y} equals J∗(y). Moreover, let ψ(x) = 1 + (m − 1)xm − mxm−1 and
according to Lebesgue integration,
Rev(M, F ′) =
∫ ∞
v=0
ψ(v) dJ∗(v) = Rev(M, F ∗).
Let J(y) be the measure of the set {v|v > 0 and F (v) ≤ y}. Since for any v, F ∗(v) ≥ F (v), we
have
{v|v > 0 and F ∗(v) ≤ y} ⊆ {v|v > 0 and F (v) ≤ y},
which indicates that for any value v, J∗(v) ≤ J(v), and F ′(v) ≤ F (v). Finally, we show that∫ ∞
v=0
|F ′(v)− F (v)|dv =
∫ ∞
v=0
[F ′(v)− F (v)]dv
=
∫ ∞
v=0
[F ∗(v)− F (v)]dv =
∫ ∞
v=0
|F ∗(v)− F (v)|dv
and the constructed distribution F ′ satisfies all the constraints in (13). Therefore, with the con-
straint F (v) ≤ F ′(v), we can neglect the monotonicity constraint of F ′(v).
Now we are ready to prove the part (2) of the theorem. Let v′ be the smallest number such that
∀v ≥ v′, G(v) = F (v). If v′ ≤ k, by setting l = k, part (1) holds. If v′ > k, set l = v′. Assuming
for contradiction that that G(l) > G(k), according to the construction of v′, there exists a value
s ∈ (k, l) and a sufficiently small ǫ′ such that G(v) > F (v), G(v) > G(k) for any v ∈ [s− ǫ′, s+ ǫ′].
We define
δ =
1
2
min
v∈[s−ǫ′,s+ǫ′]
min{G(v) − F (v), G(v) −G(k)}.
We note that δ > 0. Construct a new “distribution” G′ with G′(v) = G(v)+δ for any v ∈ [s− ǫ′, s],
G′(v) = G(v) − δ for any v ∈ [s, s + ǫ′]. We note that G′ may not be a real distribution since it
may not be monotone. But we have gotten rid of the monotonicity constraint. It is easy to verify
that G′ satisfies the required constraint as our choice of δ. Now we define
D(δ) , Rev(M, G) −Rev(M, G′)
=
∫ ∞
0
[(m− 1) · (Gm(v)−G′m(v)) −m · (Gm−1(v)−G′m−1(v))]dv
=
∫ s
s−ǫ′
[(m− 1) · (Gm(v) − (G(v) + δ)m)−m · (Gm−1(v)− (G(v) + δ)m−1)]dv
+
∫ s+ǫ′
s
[(m− 1) · (Gm(v)− (G(v) − δ)m)−m · (Gm−1(v)− (G(v) − δ)m−1)]dv.
Obviously, D(0) = 0. Moreover, letting ǫ∗ be a constant such that 0 < ǫ∗ < ǫ′, when δ = 0, we
have
dD(δ)
dδ
∣∣∣
δ=0
=
∫ s
s−ǫ′
m(m− 1) · (Gm−2(v)−Gm−1(v)) dv +
∫ s+ǫ′
s
m(m− 1) · (Gm−1(v)−Gm−2(v)) dv
≥ m(m− 1)
[
(ǫ′ − ǫ∗)(Gm−2(s − ǫ∗)−Gm−1(s− ǫ∗)) + ǫ∗(Gm−2(s)−Gm−1(s))
]
+m(m− 1)
[
ǫ∗(Gm−1(s)−Gm−2(s)) + (ǫ′ − ǫ∗)(Gm−1(s + ǫ∗)−Gm−2(s+ ǫ∗))
]
= m(m− 1)(ǫ′ − ǫ∗) ·
∫ Gs+ǫ∗
Gs−ǫ∗
[(m− 1)xm−2 − (m− 2)xm−3] dx > 0.
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The above inequality holds because xm−2 − xm−1 is monotone decreasing when x ≥ m−2
m−1 , and
G(v) ≥ m−2
m−1 when v ≥ s− ǫ′ > k. Therefore, there exists a sufficiently small δ such that D(δ) > 0,
which means that the revenue of G′ is smaller, a contradiction. Hence, part (2) of the theorem is
correct.
The proof of part (3) is similar to the proof of part (2). Suppose otherwise, there exists s, ι
and ǫ′ such that for any v ∈ [s− ǫ′, s + ǫ′], G(v) < m−2
m−1 − ι and G(v) > F (v) + ι. Consider anther
distribution G′ with G′(v) = G(v) − ι for any v ∈ [s − ǫˆ, s], G′(v) = G(v) + ι for any v ∈ [s, s+ ǫˆ].
Applying the same approach before, we can verify that for sufficiently small ι, the revenue of G′
is smaller because the second derivative of 1 + (m − 1)xm −m · xm−1 is negative when x < m−2
m−1 ,
which is a contradiction. The detailed proof is omitted here. Therefore ∀j < k, G(j) = F (j). By
combining all the proofs together, Theorem 5 holds.
4.2 Second Price With Fixed Reserve
As shown above, we have characterized the distribution with minimum revenue in the second price
mechanism. By extending the result to second price mechanism with a fixed reserve, we then show
how to use this characterization as a tool to design a FPTAS algorithm for finding the optimal
robust reserve. Here we assume the value distribution has bounded support.
Theorem 6. For any constant ǫ, ǫ′, if the buyers’ value distribution is Lipschitz continuous with
support in [0,H], and M is the set of second price mechanisms with reserves, there exists a polyno-
mial time (poly(m, 1
ǫ′
,H)) algorithm for finding mechanism M∗ such that
min
f ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)
Rev(M∗, f ′) ≥ max
M∈M
min
f ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)
Rev(M, f ′)− ǫ′,
where M is the set of second price mechanisms with fixed reserves.
Note that we do not have any close form formula for the minimum revenue within ǫ earth
mover’s distance. In order to find the approximately optimal reserve, we need to limit the possible
choice of reserves. Since the buyers’ values locate in support [0,H], we consider the reserve being
the multiply of ǫ1. That is, we only consider the reserve in the set R = {i · ǫ1}i∈[H
ǫ1
]. We prove that
this is sufficient to compute the approximately optimal reserve.
Lemma 2. There exists a second price mechanism M′ with reserve r′ ∈ R such that
min
f ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)
Rev(M′, f ′) ≥ max
M∈M
min
f ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)
Rev(M, f ′)− ǫ1.
Proof. Let the optimal mechanism beM∗ = argmaxM∈Mminf ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)Rev(M, f ′). Suppose the
mechanism M∗ has reserve r∗. By simply setting r′ = max{r ∈ R|r ≤ r∗}, we only need to prove
that for any distribution f ′ ∈ EMD(f, ǫ),
Rev(M′, f ′) ≥ Rev(M∗, f ′)− ǫ1. (14)
In fact, by construction of R, r′ ≥ r∗ − ǫ1. Therefore, for any valuation profile, the payment in
M′ is at least the payment in M∗ minus ǫ1. Hence, for any distribution f ′, the expected payment
satisfies Equation 14, and Lemma 2 holds.
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Proof of Theorem 6. By Lemma 2, we can focus on computing the minimum revenue for a fixed
reserve price r. To begin with, we explicitly express the revenue of a distribution in terms of its
cumulative probability function. For simplicity, we assume without loss of generality that a buyer
can only get the item if he bids strictly larger than the reserve. Then, we can rewrite the expected
revenue of the second price with reserve is
Rev(M, f ′) = r · Pr(1st price > r) +
∫ ∞
r
Pr(2nd price > v)dv
=r(1− F ′m(r)) +
∫ ∞
r
(1 + (m− 1)F ′m(v)−m · F ′m−1(v)) dv.
First, let g , argminf ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)Rev(M, f ′) denote the worst distribution for the second price
mechanism with reserve M, and G is its corresponding cumulative distribution. Note that it is
meaningless to move the distribution below the reserve r. Therefore, for any v ≤ r, G(v) = F (v).
Moreover, similar to Theorem 5, we have EMD(G,F ) = ǫ. Assuming that k is the smallest number
such that G(k) ≥ max{G(r), m−2
m−1}, we have the following characterization.
1. There exists l ≥ k such that G(v) = G(k) for any k ≤ v ≤ l, and G(v) = F (v) for any v > l.
2. For any r ≤ v < k,Gv = max{F (v), G(r)}.
The proof of the first property is identical to the Theorem 5. For the second property, as stated
in Theorem 5, in order to have the distribution with minimum revenue, for any v, we always have
G(v) ≥ F (v). By monotonicity of the cumulative probability function, we have G(v) ≥ G(r) for
any v ≥ r. Therefore, For any r ≤ v < k,G(v) ≥ max{F (v), G(r)}. Assuming that the equality
does not hold, there exists s and ǫ′ such that for any v ∈ [s − ǫ′, s + ǫ′], G(v) > max{F (v), G(r)}.
Similar to the proof of Theorem 5, we can construct another valid distribution G′ with smaller
revenue, where G′(v) = G(v)− δ for any v ∈ [s, s+ ǫ′], G′(v) = G(v) + δ for any v ∈ [s− ǫ′, s], and
δ is also a sufficiently small constant.
With these characterization, we know that it is sufficient to compute the value Gr, k and
l to determine the distribution G. Note that those three variable satisfies the constraint that
EMD(G,F ) = ǫ. Therefore, it is sufficient for us to determine k and l.
First, we discretize the cumulative probability space [0, 1] into Q =
{[
ǫ2·i
m2H
, ǫ2·(i+1)
m2H
]}
i∈[m2H
ǫ2
]
.
We show that for any mechanism M, there exists a distribution G′ with k′, l′ such that k′ =
max{i|F (i) ∈ Q, i ≥ k}, l′ = max{i|F (i) ∈ Q, i ≤ l}, and
Rev(M, G′) ≤ min
f ′∈EMD(f,ǫ)
Rev(M, f ′) +O(ǫ2).
If the above statement is true, then by brute force searching all possible combinations of k, l,
we can approximately estimate the minimum revenue for mechanism M. Note that by our con-
struction, G(v) − 2ǫ2
m2H
≤ G′(v) ≤ G(v) for any v ∈ [k, l], G′(r) ≥ G(r), and
Rev(M, G′)−Rev(M, G)
≤
∫ l
k
((m− 1)G′m(v) −m ·G′m−1(v) − ((m− 1)Gm(v)−m ·Gm−1(v)))dv
≤ (l − k)((m− 1)G′m(k)−m ·G′m−1(k)− ((m− 1)Gm(k)−m ·Gm−1(k)))
≤ mH(Gm−1(k)−G′m−1(k)) ≤ O(ǫ2).
By carefully choosing ǫ1 and ǫ2, Theorem 6 holds.
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5 Conclusion and Future Direction
We characterized the optimal robust mechanism for single-buyer case and the optimal robust reserve
price for the second price auction for the multi-buyer case. However, many interesting questions are
left open. For starters, it would be exciting to bound the gap between the worst case performance
of the second price mechanism with a fixed reserve and the optimal robust mechanism. Moreover,
we do not have any characterization of the optimal robust mechanism for this max-min goal when
there are more than one buyer. For this problem, we conjecture that when the known distribution is
regular, second price mechanism with randomized reserves is optimal. Another interesting direction
is to investigate this problem in the multi-parameter setting. The revenue maximization problem
for multi-parameter setting is notoriously hard. So, a good starting point would be analyzing the
performance of the simple constant approximation mechanisms for this case.
References
Bergemann, D. and Schlag, K. (2008). Robust monopoly pricing. Journal of Economic Theory,
146(6):2527–2543.
Cai, Y. and Daskalakis, C. (2017). Learning multi-item auctions with (or without) samples. In
58th Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS’17), pages 516–527.
Cai, Y., Daskalakis, C., and Weinberg, S. M. (2012a). An algorithmic characterization of multi-
dimensional mechanisms. In 44th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC’12),
pages 459–478.
Cai, Y., Daskalakis, C., and Weinberg, S. M. (2012b). Optimal multi-dimensional mechanism
design: Reducing revenue to welfare maximization. In 53rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foun-
dations of Computer Science (FOCS’12), pages 130–139.
Carroll, G. (2017). Robustness and separation in multidimensional screening. Econometrica,
85(2):453–488.
Carroll, G. D. and Segal, I. R. (2016). Robustly optimal auctions with unknown resale opportunities.
Social Science Electronic Publishing.
Chen, J., Li, B., Li, Y., and Lu, P. (2018). Bayesian auctions with efficient queries. In 45th Interna-
tional Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP’18), brief announcements,
to appear.
Cole, R. and Roughgarden, T. (2014). The sample complexity of revenue maximization. In 46th
Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC’14), pages 243–252.
Devanur, N., Hartline, J., Karlin, A., and Nguyen, T. (2011). Prior-independent multi-parameter
mechanism design. In International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE’11),
pages 122–133.
Devanur, N. R., Huang, Z., and Psomas, C. (2016). The sample complexity of auctions with
side information. In 48th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC’16), pages
426–439.
17
Gravin, N. and Lu, P. (2018). Separation in correlation-robust monopolist problem with budget. In
Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages
2069–2080. SIAM.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1967). Games with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players, I–III.
Part I: The basic model. Management Science, 14(3):159–182.
Hartline, J. and Karlin, A. (2007). Profit maximization in mechanism design. In Nisan, N.,
Roughgarden, T., Tardos, E´., and Vazirani, V. V., editors, Algorithmic Game Theory, pages
331–361. Cambridge.
Myerson, R. B. (1981). Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1):58–73.
Ostrovsky, M. and Schwarz, M. (2011). Reserve prices in internet advertising auctions: a field
experiment. EC, 11:59–60.
Roughgarden, T. and Talgam-Cohen, I. (2018). Approximately optimal mechanism design. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1812.11896.
18
